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Abstract
Building Automation Systems (BAS), alternatively known as Building Management Systems (BMS), which
centralise the management of building services, are often connected to corporate networks and are routinely
accessed remotely for operational management and emergency purposes. The protocols used in BAS, in
particular BACnet, were not designed with security as a primary requirement, thus the majority of systems
operate with sub-standard or non-existent security implementations. As intrusion is thus likely easy to achieve,
intrusion detection systems should be put in place to ensure they can be detected and mitigated. Existing
intrusion detection systems typically deal only with known threats (signature-based approaches) or suffer from a
high false positive rate (anomaly-based approaches). In this paper we present an overview of the problem space
with respect to BAS, and suggest that state aware machine learning techniques could be used to discover threats
that comprise a collection of legitimate commands. We provide a first step showing that the concept can be used
to detect an attack where legitimate write commands being sent in rapid succession may cause system failure.
We capture the state as a ‘time since last write’ event and use a basic artificial neural network classifier to
detect attacks.
Keywords
Building Automation, Intrusion Detection, Artificial Neural Networks, Security, Heating Ventilation and Air
Conditioning

INTRODUCTION
The purpose of a building is to provide safety, security and comfort for workers, systems and goods which
occupy the building. The use of building automation systems (BAS) allows the collective tuning of each building
service, such as energy, Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC), water and access control through
one centralised system. With the potential to operate and manage multiple buildings from a central location
(Heaton, 2015), BAS are increasingly being connected to corporate networks, and ultimately the Internet.
Providing operability between historically serial based networking and existing communication cables, a number
of open source BAS protocols are designed to operate on many physical media. One such protocol is BACnet,
developed by the American Society of Heating, Refrigeration and Air-conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE), and
released in 1995 as ASHRAE standard 135 (SSPC-135, 2015) and ISO standard 16 484-5 in 2003 (Hersent,
Boswarthick & Elloumi, 2012). BACnet is widely used in government, industry and businesses around Australia
for building management. This usage is expected to grow, especially with the development of the Internet of
Things (IoT), making securing and protecting BACnet a critical problem
A difficulty faced in securing BAS, exemplified by BACnet, is the ability to detect legitimate commands which,
when sent in a specific pattern, manifest as a cyber-physical attack. This paper introduces a proof of concept
method of detecting a BACnet specific legitimate command attack chain using time based analysis of network
traffic. The remainder of the paper discusses Building Automation Security, in particular the application and
shortcomings of intrusion detection systems for BACnet. Network traffic classification schemes are presented,
with artificial neural networks identified as a suitable method of detecting the given problem space. A software
based simulation was deployed, with a number of experiments conducted for proof of concept testing against a
generated dataset. An ANN was used as a classifier for this attack chain, with the results in regards to efficiency
and effectiveness discussed. The paper concludes with what these results mean, and an overview of future work
related to this research.

RELATED WORK
Similar to the evolution of computing, security was not an original function of building automation systems.
High levels of trust are placed in the users and the devices, due to the previously segregated and obscure nature
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of the systems (Novak, Treytl & Palensky, 2007; Celeda, Krejci & Krmicek, 2012). As noted by Johnstone
(2009), systems are engineered for function, not security. This is a significant problem in an era where the
Internet of Things is a reality. Heterogeneous connected devices need to be secure. Much like the advancement
of other service-based systems, BAS were not designed with security as a paramount requirement. Early security
of these systems revolved around isolationism through physical security and obscure proprietary protocols
(Kastner, Neugschwandtner, Soucek & Newman, 2005). While these measures were acceptable when
automation systems were not interconnected, this is not the case now and new approaches are needed. Peacock
and Johnstone (2014) have highlighted the need for security in BMS, especially in BACnet systems. It is
possible that an approach based on machine learning may be the way forward. Johnstone and Woodward (2012)
had success with an ANN approach in a different security domain. Peacock and Johnstone (2014) concluded that
modelling known attacks in a test bed BACnet controlled BAS network to generate malicious network traffic is a
critical first step. In addition to this malicious traffic, normal operating traffic should also be recorded for
baseline purposes to apply machine learning algorithms to traffic classification.

BACNET SECURITY
Of the three major open protocols (BACnet, KNX and LONworks), the BACnet standard has adapted the most
to retrofit security techniques, defining the BACnet security service (BSS), a network layer security
implementation. BSS applies encryption to each frame; implementations pre 2009 used DES-56, with an update
to the standard in 2008 changing the default encryption algorithm to AES256. BACnet can provide integrity with
Hashed Message Authentication Codes (HMAC), using SHA256 or MD5 for key. Encryption is not the only
answer for BACnet security, with authentication of devices also of importance. Source authentication is
implemented in BACnet as a device object identification number, however announcements of device numbers
are peer based, meaning any device in the BACnet can request another devices ID, and any device can respond
with an ID. As noted in (Holmberg, 2003; Celeda et al., 2012), this behaviour can be exploited, allowing any
device in BACnet to be spoofed as another device can claim to have the requested device ID. While the BSS is
defined in the standard as Addendum g, BSS is not widely implemented, with Newman (2013) stating “no
company has yet implemented it in a commercially available product” Newman (2013, p. 44). Additionally,
Newman (2013) suggests that BACnet/IP could be secured using IP security solutions, such as IPsec, TLS, or
Kerberos. Given the vulnerabilities in these implementations, particularly TLS (Moller, Duong & Kotowicz,
2014); there remain significant security issues in BACnet.

INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM APPROACHES IN AUTOMATION AND
CONTROL SYSTEMS
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) in BAS is an immature topic area, with limited research and
implementations (Kastner et al., 2005; Krejci, Celeda & Dobrovolny, 2012). Granzer and Kastner (2010) note
that adaptation of IDS would be a useful complement with other security measures in BAS, particularly where
authentication through encryption would have an impact on the availability of the BAS. In regards to the types of
IDS implementations, Granzer and Kastner (2010) note that signature based IDSs would be inappropriate for
BAS due to the increased overhead on the system for managing and storing signatures. Rather, Granzer and
Kastner (2010) identify anomaly based IDS as a more appropriate solution, perhaps due to the changes in BAS
network traffic over time of day, week and season Kaur, Tonejc, Wendzel and Meier (2015), Krejci et al. (2012),
and the ability to tune anomaly based IDSs to these patterns. Application of anomaly detection in BACnet has
been previously undertaken by Celeda et al. (2012), using a volume based entropy technique against BACnet
flows developed in their previous work (Krejci et al., 2012). Analysis is conducted against network flows
captured from a university network, with 3 classes of BACnet attack derived from Holmberg (2003) search for,
namely, device spoofing, device discovery denial of service (DoS) and write-property attacks. No attacks were
identified in the dataset, with write-properties not exhibiting a discernible pattern in the flow based approach.
In contrast, a range of ICS based IDS have been implemented (Cheung et al., 2007; Lin, Slagell, Di Martino,
Kalbarczyk & Iyer, 2013; Dussel et al., 2010). Skopik, Friedberg and Fiedler (2014) states “All modern control
systems are deploying IDSs as the threats against these systems increase”. A limitation of ICS based IDS,
highlighted by Cheminod, Durante and Valenzano (2013) is evaluation of the performance impact of deployed
IDS. Nader, Honeine and Beauseroy (2013) identify, the limited datasets of ICS systems in critical states hinders
state based IDS research, as developing IDSs to determine when critical states occur would be more effective if
critical state network captures can be identified. Previous work to overcome the lack of critical state datasets was
conducted by Carcano et al. (2011), implementing an ICS IDS using state diagrams to model critical states. In
addition to critical state analysis, Carcano, Fovino, Masera and Trombetta (2010) identified detecting chains of
legitimate commands which manifest as malicious events is of interest; with an attempt conducted using network
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flow analysis against Modbus traffic sets. The difficulty faced with the proposed approach by Carcano et al.
(2011) is the signature based method of the IDS, with previous identification of critical states, and mapping of
known legitimate commands which can cause malicious actions to signatures.
There are limited examples of BACnet specific network attacks, with the majority driven by the BACnet wide
area threat assessment (Holmberg, 2003). Given that other cyber-physical systems, such as Modbus have known
attacks, it was theorised that applying the principles of these known attack types to BAS could reveal attack
classes. The example selected was a water-hammer attack, a threat against pipelines, whereby a valve is closed
suddenly causing a shockwave of force back through the pipe. In this context, closing the valve is a normal
action of the system, which can have an unintended effect dependent on the time the valve is closed. Similarly in
electrical motor fans, altering the fan speed is a normal process for temperature modulation in HVAC, however
drastic or consistent fan speed changes over a short period of time can cause damage to the motor drive, or the
fan shaft (Stanford III, 2011). Manipulation of the fan speed settings occurs in BACnet through writing assigned
values to properties, from a BACnet controller. This is an identified attack class from (Holmberg, 2003; Celeda
et al., 2012), namely write-property attack. Detecting these types of legitimate commands which have
unintended consequences is a network traffic classification issue, which previously implemented BACnet IDS
systems have not been tested for (Celeda et al., 2012).

NETWORK TRAFFIC CLASSIFICATION
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) essentially solve a classification problem. A frame is presented and is
classed as either safe or unsafe depending on some predefined rule(s) or application of artificial intelligence
techniques. IDSs conventionally use some form of signature detection to match incoming frames with known
problems (malformed packets, embedded trojans etc.). This approach works well when the attacks can be
predetermined and profiled (thus providing signatures). When the problem space is less well-structured, such an
approach lacks flexibility, which calls for an alternative that can detect “unknown unknowns”. Traditionally,
computers attempting to solve such problems have not performed well. Computers calculate bounded problems
swiftly, but do not do well at drawing inferences from incomplete data.
Rumelhart and McClelland (1986) contend that “In our view, people are smarter than today’s computers because
the brain employs a basic computational architecture that is more suitable to deal with a central aspect of the
natural information processing tasks that people are so good at” Therefore, an approach based on the structure of
the human brain might be successful in solving this type of problem. A common approach is the Artificial
Neural Network (ANN), which attempts to mimic the processing model of a brain, where neural synapses are
summed, limited by an activation function to prevent overload. There are several other machine learning
algorithms that solve classification problems, including Support Vector Machines and approaches based on
Bayesian probability, however we chose ANNs as the most well-established approach. A neuron in an ANN
consists of a node that has (potentially) multiple inputs and one output. The node activates the output if the sum
of the inputs reaches a predefined value, this value being defined by an activation function, which can be binary,
but need not be so. Each input can have individual weights assigned to it and it is not unusual to have a bias
parameter added to the summation as shown in (1) and (2).
(1)
𝑛

𝑠𝑗 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖 𝑥𝑖
𝑖=1

(2)

𝑜𝑗 = 𝜙(𝑠𝑗 + 𝑏𝑖𝑗 )
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒:
𝑜𝑗 = Output 𝑗
𝑏𝑖𝑗 = Bias factor applied to node 𝑠𝑗 of (1)
𝜙 = The activation function

When a neuron is located in the output layer the local gradient is calculated by using equation (3). When a
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neuron is located in the hidden layer, we use equation (4) to calculate the gradient.
(3)

𝛿𝑗 = 𝑒𝑗 𝜙𝑗′ (𝑠𝑗 )
(4)

𝛿𝑗 = −

∂ℰ ′
𝜙 (𝑠 )
∂𝑦𝑗 𝑗 𝑗

𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒:
Neuron 𝑗 is hidden
𝑒 = error term
We can map the logic of this single node to a network consisting of many nodes in three layers, an input layer, a
middle (hidden) layer and an output layer, the latter of which defines the solution space. There are many ANN
algorithms of varying efficacy, depending on the problem domain being addressed. One of the most popular is
the Backpropagation algorithm, which works by providing feedback to prior nodes in the network and thus
improving learning and subsequent classification. Backpropagation is computationally efficient and simple to
compute as noted by Haykin (2009)

EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT
Simulation was chosen as the method of data collection, due to the limitation of available BACnet data sources,
and the proof of concept nature of the research. Additionally, due to attacks being executed for network capture,
a live system was not appropriate. The software used for simulation included the SCADA Engine BACnet
device simulator 2.0 running on a Windows XP service pack 2 virtual machine(‘BACnet Device Simulator 2.0’,
2009), and a Ubuntu 13.04 virtual machine, running the Open source BACnet Stack ver 0.8.2 (Karg, 2015). The
virtual machines were hosted on a Macbook Pro 2015, with OS X 10.10.5, 16Gb of memory and 2.9GHz i5
processor. The topology of the simulation environment is shown as Figure 1, Scadaengine was used for the
simulated temperature sensor and fan, while the BACnet stack acted as the controller, receiving temperature
readings from the simulated temperature sensor, and sending fan speed commands to the simulated fan.

Figure 1: Network Topology of simulated BACnet HVAC environment

The simulated scenario was that of a simplistic partial HVAC system, using 1 temperature sensor, 1 fan and 1
HVAC controller communicating between the two devices. In accordance with HVAC design practices, fan
speed changes occurred at a minimum 15 second interval, to replicate time delays present to prevent fan drive
damage Stanford III (2011) A dormant threat in the controller pseudo-randomly interacted with the fan, sending
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legitimate fan speed change commands in quick succession of each other, with the intent to cause physical
damage to the fan.
The data set generated contained 3 hours of BACnet simulated data, equating to 25000 frames. Pre-processing of
the data involved removing all but the write frames, which were paired into events, resulting in 1000 write
events. This pre-processing of the network traffic was implemented to replicate a real-time IDS, whereby nonmatching frames would be discarded. The time difference (∆t) between same frames (writes) are the events of
interest as we are attempting to detect a subtle attack whereby all frames are legitimate commands. The first 500
events were used to train an ANN (a backpropagation algorithm defined by 1-4) and the second 500 to test
effectiveness of the trained ANN in classifying previously unseen events. The hardware used for ANN analysis
was a Macbook Pro, with OS X (10.9.2) configured with 16Gb of memory and a 2.2GHz i7 processor.

RESULTS
The ANN was optimised through testing the number of iterations, the number of hidden layers and the learning
rate. Testing began with a simple three-layer network (i.e., a single hidden layer). The results were encouraging,
with a training time of 6.349 seconds and a classification accuracy of 90.4% against the test data set, with a
classification time of 0.005 seconds. The ANN was then extended to four layers (i.e., an input layer, two hidden
layers and an output layer). In this ANN, the training time was 5.718 seconds with a classification accuracy of
100.0% (classification time 0.006 sec.). With three hidden layers, the training time was 2.059 seconds and had a
classification accuracy of 100.0% (classification time 0.007 sec.). Figure 2 shows that both three and five hidden
layers appear to be optimal, the classification time is longer for five hidden layers. (0.008 sec.).

Figure 2: Number of hidden layers compared to the training time

Given that Backpropagation is a gradient descent method, it is possible for the ANN to not perform well if it
does not converge on the global error maximum. We examined the error rate as illustrated in Figure 3 to ensure
that the ANN was not being trapped in a local (non-optimal) minimum. Table 1 shows that the training time for
the ANN increases linearly with the number of iterations, this is not an issue provided training time is not the
rate determining step. There was a 10% decrease in classification accuracy when the learning rate was varied
from 1.0 to 0.1. The learning rate is a measure of the size of the step taken down the gradient, so large values of
learning rate correspond to smaller steps (which would be more accurate, but take longer to converge).
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Figure 3: Error convergence in the ANN.
Table 1: Iterations of the ANN vs. Training Time of the Network.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We provide a novel solution to one proof of concept attack against BACnet devices, through the use of ANN
classification of time differences between frames of the same type. Though drawing general conclusions based
on this preliminary work would be premature, it does indicate that taking into account specific aspects of the
system state, in this case the time since the last write event, can help in detection of specific types of threats that
BACnet devices and in general BAS face. By considering the context and threat model we have concluded that
the time since the last write event is the relevant state information. Without considering this, the machine
learning failed to find the attack; the critical information was hidden amongst the noise. By making the state
explicit the machine learning perfectly captures the attack. The critical state information that we consider here is
relatively simple requiring only the time since the last write event. With more complex BAS more complex
classes of attack and thus more complex critical state models could be conducted. For example for the action
‘open window’ relevant context may include ‘windy outside’ and ‘door open’. Correct critical state modelling
will be key for creating a successful detection engine. While considering a general attack model and
corresponding potentially critical states of the system is more specific than trying to learn without any attacker
model (which, as our results support, will simply not work) yet still a lot more general than a signature (or other
blacklisting heuristic) for detecting attacks. We conclude that, while still being limited, our results support that
state-based intrusion detection is a promising line to pursue.
Future work will thus try to take our promising preliminary results and extend them to fully validate state-based
intrusion detection as a suitable approach for the BAS domain. The ANN approach used in this paper only aimed
at showing the possibility to distinguish the attacks from the normal traffic. It does not necessarily reflect the
best approach for an intrusion detection system. In future work we will look at different anomaly detection
mechanisms considering key intrusion detection requirements, for example, the ability to understand alerts, so
called white-box approaches as promoted by Costante, den Hartog, Petkovic, Etalle and Pechenizkiy (2014) and
the potential for live system data analysis. We will also increase the relevance of the experiments by expanding
to a larger data set, with a larger simulated BACnet. Further classes of attacks which could be detected using this
approach will be investigated, along with corresponding critical state information needed. Also legitimate
command attacks applied against other similar protocols, such as Modbus, Siemens S7 and Zigbee will be
considered.
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